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In this response to Anna Wärnsby’s article, I address her two sets of concerns: 
(a) general issues surrounding constructional approaches to language, and (b) 
particular issues surrounding English modal verb constructions. The former is 
the subject of considerable debate (see for example the debate between Aarts 
(2004, 2007) and Croft (2007) on gradience, and more recently, that between 
Adger (2013) and Goldberg (2013a) on the explanatory power of constructions 
in the usage-based model), and I will not address all of the possible issues. 
Instead, I structure my commentary by making reference to the four main issues 
that Wärnsby (hereafter W) sees in constructional approaches to modals in 
English, namely: 
 
a. the number and complexity of constructions required for an accurate 
grammatical description of the modals;  
b. the role of context, and the lack of formalization of context in Construction 
Grammar (hereafter CxG);  
c. the scope of schematic constructions;  
d. indeterminacy.  
 
The balance between explicitness and economy in representation is a problem 
for all grammatical frameworks. The English modals are a particularly good case 
study to illustrate this point, especially when it comes to the issue of language 
change. The facts surrounding the development of (English) modals suggest a 
very messy picture, with a significant lack of uniformity in the development of 
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the individual modal verbs over time (see Warner 1993, and the commentary in 
Fischer 2007). Traditional generative approaches risked oversimplification by 
failing to treat each micro-construction with sufficient care, while more modern 
generative approaches typically adopt an approach whose levels of detail and 
fine-grainedness are similar to those of constructional approaches (see e.g. 
Roberts 2010). The detail is necessary because the modals are a particularly 
messy category (synchronically, as a result of their diachronic development).  
 
§2 Issue 1: The number and complexity of constructions required 
 
W’s first concern derives from her analysis of a number of tokens extracted from 
the English-Swedish Parallel Corpus and presented in detail in Wärnsby (2002). 
Based on these data, W suggests that at least 13 different constructions are 
required to accurately capture the range of complementation patterns (e.g. 
where the lexical verb is in the form of the past participle, as in it may be parked 
somewhere in Ipswich [Wärnsby 2002, ex. 11), or where the verbal complement 
is a NP, as in it may be the thin end of the wedge [Wärnsby 2002, ex. 10]). W’s 
reasons for positing these constructions appear to be connected to a principle 
outlined by Goldberg (1995), which W refers to as a Principle of No [Syntactic] 
Synonymy1. 
                                                        
1 It is not absolutely clear to me what is meant by a Principle of No [Syntactic] 
Synonymy, i.e. why the word syntactic is included and then put in brackets, and 
whether this is intended to mean something different from Goldberg (1995). 
Goldberg outlines a Principle of No Synonymy; this is concerned with the claim 
that if two constructions differ in syntactic form, they will be different in some 
way in terms of their meaning – if there is semantic synonymy, the constructions 
will be pragmatically distinct; if there is pragmatic synonymy, the constructions 
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 Concerned that this involves speakers having to learn an unnecessarily 
high number of distinct constructional patterns, W then points out that a 
potential solution may be found by invoking multiple inheritance, i.e. a situation 
where a given token inherits from a number of different parent constructions. 
However, she feels that even this would result in a ‘bewildering web of 
constructions’, and suggests that, unlike the case of the Caused Motion 
Construction, it is much harder to suggest a motivation for positing a 
prototypical modal construction for English which would contribute most 
frequently or most centrally in such an inheritance network. 
  My own response to these concerns (possibly not shared by other 
practitioners of CxG) is as follows. First, it is not clear to me that the examples W 
provides are genuinely of different constructional types. Rather, they are tokens, 
instances of the combinatory output of multiple inheritance (to which I will 
return below). Thus, [NP MAYe BE VenSTATE] is not a construction of English; 
the corpus example it may be parked somewhere in Ipswich is a token that is the 
product of inheritance from a number of constructions, some contentful (such as 
park) and some procedural (such as the Copular Construction), but is not 
sanctioned by a micro-construction such as the one W suggests, because there is 
no need to posit a separate form-meaning pairing at that level. We can certainly 
find examples where may appears in sequences with a pronominal subject, and a 
passive auxiliary, and a locative adjunct, but that does not require a separate 
micro-construction. What speakers of English know is that inheritance from both 
                                                                                                                                                              
will be semantically distinct. I will assume that Wärnsby is referring to the 
principle as laid out in Goldberg (1995), without modification. 
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a modal construction and a copular construction can result in well-formed 
expression. 
 Second, the issue of multiple inheritance does indeed require knowledge 
of a very complex web of constructional types. In addition, it can also mean the 
storage of many redundancies, and in some cognitive theories, the (short-term) 
storage of tokens (Hudson 2007, 2010), or of exemplars (Bybee 2013). This is 
not a problem restricted to the modals, but rather a more general issue 
concerning how much of our knowledge of language involves storage, and how 
this links to inheritance. Consider in this regard the following example cited in 
Denison and Cort (2010; emphasis added): 
 
 (1) lol well you better start staying in betternt you !!!!!! lol 
 
For many readers of this article, this may be the first time they have encountered 
a token involving the multiple inheritance of a modal construction BETTER and 
the tag question construction. Indeed, in such a case this particular 
constructional inheritance may be so unusual as to strike some readers as 
ungrammatical. Yet the ability to process this construct requires such a reader to 
go beyond what they know (i.e. their current grammar) and allow inheritance to 
apply to this novel exemplar. It is not conventional for such a reader to have 
modal BETTER and the tag question construction to combine in an inheritance 
network, so this particular use requires the reader to extend their network to 
allow processing of this particular combination. Given the relative infrequency of 
the use of BETTER as a modal anyway (in contrast to the sequence HAD 
BETTER), it may well be that this inheritance pattern does not become 
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conventionalized for the reader. The crucial point is that what is stored varies 
between language users: for those for whom the sequence is unremarkable and 
grammatical, all that is stored are the types (i.e. the modal construction BETTER 
and the tag question construction); for those for whom the sequence is 
ungrammatical, there may be temporary storage of the token, but this will fade if 
not reinforced by frequent use. In neither case, however, is it necessary to 
suggest that betternt you is stored as a type. And in the former case, it is not 
necessary to suggest that a construction whose form is [[NEG MODAL] 
[PRONOUN]] is stored: tokens such as won’t you? and can’t I? can be processed 
and produced using more general constructions and multiple inheritance. 
 This leads to the third issue, which is to do with prototype effects. I agree 
with W that none of her examples (1)-(6) are more epistemic than any of the 
others, but as I have suggested above, I would not treat (1)-(6) as separate modal 
constructions.  But her corpus analysis (as presented in Wärnsby 2002) does 
suggest that, of the various possible combinations (e.g. with different subject 
types, or with multiple auxiliaries), the most frequent for epistemic may is the 
sequence where, among other things, there is no other auxiliary present, and the 
main verb is a stative. Such a combination accounts for just over 40% of the 
tokens. A fuller statistical analysis would need to consider, among other things, 
the overall frequency of statives in the corpus, and it would be useful to carry out 
a collostructional analysis to see the extent to which statives are indeed the 
preferred context for may in comparison with other epistemic modals (cf. Hilpert 
2008 on the changing collostructional profile of English BE going to over time). 
In order to establish whether or not CxG can add something that other 
frameworks cannot, I think it would be necessary to re-examine the corpus data 
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using the tools associated with corpus-based approaches to constructional 
preferences (see e.g. the discussion in Stefanowitsch 2013). 
 
 
§3 Issue 2: The role of context 
 
The role of context in CxG has been described in some detail, both synchronically 
and diachronically. W’s decision tree for may (her figure 1) is compatible with a 
constructional approach to context, and indeed co-text (see further Bergs and 
Diewald (2009) on this distinction in constructional terms), as is her insight into 
the subtleties of meaning variation associated with English modal verbs. 
 As Boogaart (2009: 231) has observed, in exploring the role of context 
and modal constructions, analysis has focused not on the properties of the 
individual model item (such as Dutch kunnen or English may), but on the 
properties of the construction for which the modal verb is the profile 
determinant (Langacker 1987), and the particular contexts in which such 
constructions are used. Boogaart (2009) also foregrounds the importance of 
semantic maps in constructional analyses of modals (see e.g. van der Auwera and 
Plungian 1998). How might we bring together the kind of decision tree that W 
proposes, with the constructional analysis of context that Boogart (2009) 
advocates? 
 One possibility is to see epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality not as 
properties of individual modal verbs, but as part of a set of semantic domains 
which come to be associated with various modal constructions (see also 
Boogaart 2009, Croft 2010). Sometimes these modal constructions have 
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modality as a feature of the profile determinant (i.e. as a clausal head), as is the 
case with English modal verbs, but this need not be the case (e.g. when modality 
is expressed by an adjunct such as the adverb perhaps). W’s decision tree could 
then be seen as a speaker or hearer’s guide towards a particular location on the 
map. Furthermore, if this decision tree was to be considered ‘cumulatively’, one 
could imagine a situation for a given instance of use, where the subject was ‘not 
in control of the action’, the aspect perfective, the verb stative and so on, in 
which we have a series of properties which mark out the conceptual core of an 
epistemic modal construct. In other words, the ‘decision tree’ is the result of 
speaker generalisations about typical and less typical epistemic constructions. 
This too fits in with perspectives on semantic maps, where particular semantic 
categories such as modality types can be seen as “generalizations over a large 
class of specific occurrences of […] meanings in situation types produced in 
utterances” (Croft 2010: 56). W’s decision tree features particular co-textual 
properties (e.g. person of the subject, presence of other (aspectual) auxiliaries) 
which can also be incorporated into an account in which we see particular 
constructs as the product of multiple inheritance from a number of 
constructional types. 
One final remark on the topic of context concerns W’s claim that “the role 
of context as well as what contextual features to be included in a modal 
construction is not yet formalised.” It is true that some variants of CxG have a 
less developed formalism, but this is not true of all variants. Some models of CxG, 
such as Sign-Based Construction Grammar (e.g. Sag 2012), are highly formalized. 
Furthermore, some research on constructional change, such as Fried (2009), has 
been explicitly concerned with “what types of context may enter conventional 
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linguistic patterning” (Fried 2009: 63). Fried (2009) suggests that three 
particular types of context need to be considered in relation to the shape of 
constructions and their evolution: 
 
a. the pragmatic conditions in which constructions are used by speakers and 
hearers; 
b. information structuring and the roles played by discourse participants; 
c. the cotext (including collocational preferences). 
 
Quite how such contextual properties are to be formalized is an ongoing issue in 
constructional research (semantic frames again feature in this formalization); 
but there is clear evidence in the work of Fried and others that the role of context 
and what contextual features should be included in a construction has been 
formalized in some varieties of CxG. 
 
 
§4 Issue 3: The scope of schematic constructions 
 
The third concern that W raises is one which goes beyond the question of modal 
constructions in particular. Essentially, it focuses on the extent of generality in 
the constructional network – just how schematic can constructions get? W then 
links this issue to the problem of recovering implicit purpose clauses which 
might be associated with particular uses of deontic modal constructions. 
 How schematic constructions can get is an empirical question. It is part of 
a more general question that is central in constructional approaches to language: 
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what are conventional symbolic units (i.e. constructions) used by a community 
or network of speakers? As Kay observes, a linguist cannot know whether, for an 
individual speaker, particular generalizations represent “psychologically real 
entities. The relevant obligation of the grammarian, under this view, is to 
abstract from the data of the language all the generalizations […] that a speaker-
hearer might extract” (Kay 2004: 697, emphasis original). However, there is, in 
usage-based models of CxG, the further issue of frequency: “schematic 
constructions are posited only when justified by sufficiently high type frequency 
and degree of morphosyntactic and semantic similarity; more specific 
constructions may also be posited if they are of sufficiently high token 
frequency” (Croft 2013: 223). 
 There are, then, two grounds for proposing a given form-meaning pairing 
constitutes a construction in a community. One involves idiosyncracy, in some 
aspect of form, meaning or the association between form and meaning (Goldberg 
1995); the other involves frequency of use, where fully compositional strings 
may be considered constructions if they are used with sufficient frequency 
(Goldberg 2006). The question then is whether, in W’s terms, there is a 
“motivated reason for positing meaningful modal constructions”. As atomic 
constructions, there is clearly idiosyncracy involved, and many individual 
modals are highly frequent in use, of course. But a more critical issue is whether 
we should be focusing on the combination of modals (as atomic constructions) 
with other more abstract schemas. Citing Eide (2002), W suggests that (2) – her 
example (7) – is epistemic: 
 
(2) The patient must have been mistreated 
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What determines this interpretation? W suggests that the addition of a purpose 
clause (e.g. to get compensation) would render the interpretation as deontic, but 
without it, the epistemic reading is preferred. Consider, however, an example 
like (3): 
 
(3) Tickets must have been validated 
 
It is not clear to me that we require some implicit purpose clause here to force a 
deontic reading: there clearly is a purposive that is implicit here (e.g. something 
like in order to qualify for free parking), but my point is that an epistemic reading 
is dispreferred anyway, in contrast to (3), even without invoking that purposive. 
This does not, however, solve the problem of W’s example (9), given here as (4): 
 
 (4) I must be brave, I must maintain my own high standards. 
 
W observes that this example is one where a speaker is a prisoner telling herself 
that she needs to be brave in order to remain sane. W suggests that it is difficult 
in CxG to account for the deontic use here, given that speakers rarely give 
themselves orders; we would need to stipulate this somewhere in the 
construction.   
 My suggested solution to this problem is to consider a related context: the 
context when speakers engage in self-talk. As Holmberg (2010) has observed, 
there are cases where speakers can vary between using I and you in self talk: 
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(5) I’m an idiot! 
(6) You’re an idiot! 
 
but there are other cases where variation is not possible. For instance, if the 
matrix verb is a verb of cognition, you appears to be dispreferred, even if there is 
variation in the subject of the non-matrix verb. The following examples come 
from Holmberg (2010: 187), his examples (6) and (10), with his own 
grammaticality judgements: 
 
(7) I think I’ve had it!/I think you’ve had it! 
(8) *You think I’ve had it!/*You think you’ve had it! 
 
The key issue is that in self-talk, “you can assume the role of speaker or 
addressee”, but in some instances (associated with assertions or questions 
regarding state of mind, for example), only one of the options is available 
(Holmberg 2010: 187-188). 
 How does this relate to the issue of the modal construction under 
discussion? Here is the example W provides, but in its wider context. It is taken 
from a novel by Sue Townsend, about an imagined world where the United 
Kingdom becomes a republic, and the British Queen is forced to live as an 
ordinary citizen. In this part of the novel, the Queen is prevented from leaving 
the street on which she now lives: 
 
(9) The Queen walked around the Close four times. Nobody was about 
apart from the odd mongrel dog. She thought, I am living in a 
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ghetto. I must consider myself a prisoner of war. I must be brave, I 
must maintain my own high standards. (Townsend 1992) 
 
This is not an instance of self-talk, but one of direct thought. But as in the case of 
self-talk, the context suggests a situation where the self can be conceptualized as 
both ‘thinker’ and ‘thought-of’, which serves as an equivalent to the speaker or 
addressee in self-talk (cf. she thought, you are living in a ghetto, etc.), and either 
first or second person pronouns may be used. In this context, there is an 
obligation laid down by the ‘thinker’ on the ‘thought-of’, and while typically one 
might not expect the use of first person pronouns in the laying down of an 
obligation, speakers of English permit variation in contexts of the ‘split-self’, i.e. 
in self-talk or self-directed thought2. 
However, even if the reader is not convinced by this possible explanation 
of the use of the first-person pronoun in this case, there is a more general point 
to be made. Some of the analytic concerns that W raises strike me as problems 
that are not particular to constructional approaches. The problem of the 
relationship between world knowledge and linguistic form is an issue for any 
model of language. What CxG does (and this is true of all usage-based network 
models) is to try to establish which routes to follow between a given usage-event 
(and all its contextual properties) and an abstract type which provides the best 
fit (Hudson 2007). From a usage-based perspective, understanding (and 
producing) utterances relies on our capacity to: 
 
                                                        
2 I am essentially treating the linguistic representation of direct thought in 
literature on the one hand, and self-talk on the other, as instances of 
intrapersonal communication. 
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a. conceptualise individual items, both procedural (e.g. must) and contentful (e.g. 
brave); 
b. understand how those items combine and are interpreted once combined (e.g. 
I must be brave is most likely intended/interpreted as deontic while I must be 
stupid is most likely epistemic, but both can be overriden in particular discourse 
contexts); 
c. establish the relevant inheritance properties.  
 
Repeated exposure to similar patterns of use gives rise to probabilistic 
associations of meaning with form. Thus one explanation for the difference W 
alludes to is our experience of characteristics we ascribe to ourselves, whether 
this be exhortations to a particular kind of behaviour (leading to a deontic 




§5 Issue 4: Indeterminacy 
 
The matter of modals and indeterminacy links up to the issues discussed in 
section 3, on context, but relates more crucially to the notion of inheritance 
relations that are central to usage-based constructional approaches, as 
discussion in section 2. As a result, I will not comment extensively on this topic 
for risk of repeating myself, but the main issues seem to be these. Recent work 
on language change within a cognitive linguistics framework has focused on 
multiple inheritance (see De Smet et al 2013), and both constructional and non-
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constructional usage-based linguistic frameworks (see e.g. Hudson 2007 for an 
example of the latter) make use of the concept of multiple inheritance in the 
grammatical architecture. As discussed above, in such models, a particular token 
utterance may be sanctioned by more than one type, which may either be 
associated with differences in parsing, or polysemy effects. Construct 
indeterminacy is a natural consequence of such inheritance networks. For 
further discussion of the relationship between monosemy, polysemy and 
semantic maps in connection with modal constructions, the reader is referred to 
Boogaart (2009). 
   
 
§6 General criticisms of CxG 
 
W ends her article with a number of general concerns about CxG, which I will 
briefly respond to here. I hope to have shown that CxG is more than just a 
possible tool for the analysis of English modal constructions, and that it can 
provide a plausible and coherent account based on a series of general principles. 
My view is that generalisations are possible, but they are perhaps not the kind of 
generalisations that researchers in linguistic modality are accustomed to. W 
suggests that more psycholinguistic research is needed in order to delimit the 
‘bewildering web of constructions’, but I think it is fair to say that there have 
been many psycholinguistic studies which have investigated the status of 
constructions (see Bencini 2013 for a summary). I agree with W that 
constructions should only be posited when there is sufficient evidence so to do, 
but it may simply be the case that the constructional network is vast and 
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complex. W seems to suggest that most work in CxG is concerned with argument 
structure (I assume this is what is meant by “constructions localized within a 
clausal structure”); while this might have been true of some early work, there is 
now much work within CxG on information structuring (e.g. Lambrecht 2001, 
Pattern 2012), on filler-gap constructions (e.g. Sag 2010), and on morphological 





In her paper, W has clearly and cogently addressed a number of concerns she has 
with the constructional enterprise more generally, and with a constructional 
analysis of the English modal system in particular. In this response, I have 
attempted to show how, based on my personal view of constructions and CxG, it 
is possible to respond to those concerns. CxG is not monolithic, and while there 
are many areas of agreement (see Goldberg 2013b), different varieties involve 
different degrees of formal representation. There are some very formal variants 
of CxG, such as Sign-Based Construction Grammar (Sag 2012), while the more 
usage-based models tend to involve less formal representation.  
In all cases, there is the important question of the empirical verification of 
particular claims. One concern of W’s is establishing verifiable measures to 
ascertain how schematic a particular part of the constructional network is. There 
is a balance to be struck between economy and explicitness, both in terms of 
processing and production. But the point is that this is an empirical question, 
working from the principle that speakers generalize as little as possible but as 
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much as is necessary. There appears to be corpus-based evidence that some 
types of change involve more schematization (or strengthening of the cognitive 
representation of a schema) than others (Hilpert 2015), and this seems to be 
further supported by computational work on emergent systematicity in 
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